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Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) showed that when agents learn-by-doing and are
myopic, less advanced agents may adopt new technologies while more advanced
¯rms stick with the old technology since the new technology takes time to learn.
In this case, the less advanced agents might eventually overtake (or \leapfrog")
the advanced agents. We show that this kind of overtaking can also occur if
agents are forward looking and have high discount rates. However, if agents are
su±ciently patient, overtaking cannot occur. A lower discount rate increases the
set of states at which agents adopt new technologies, so more patient agents tend
to upgrade their technology more frequently.
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nomic growth
JEL Classi¯cation numbers D92, O14,O331 Introduction
Modern development economics emphasizes the role of technology in determining
relative growth paths. For example, Lucas (1993) identi¯es technology adoption
as the most important explanation of the fast economic growth of several Asian
countries. Recent textbooks such as Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995) re°ect the importance attributed to technology in explaining
growth. Technological improvements can lead to divergence in growth paths
when ¯rms in the \advanced" country have a greater incentive to adopt new
technology. In other circumstances, ¯rms in less advanced countries may be
more likely adopt the new technology, even when it is less pro¯table for them
than for the advanced ¯rms. The adoption decision depends on a comparison
of pro¯ts under the new technology and under the next best alternative, i.e. on
the opportunity cost of adoption. The opportunity cost of adoption may be
higher for the more advanced ¯rms, because of their pro¯ciency in using the
old technology. In this case, innovations in technology can contribute to the
convergence of growth paths, or even to \overtaking" (or \leapfrogging") by the
less advanced country.
There have been a number of historical examples where technology adoption
has contributed to overtaking, both at the industry and country level. Industries
in regions destroyed by war (such as in post-war Europe and Japan) sometimes
rebuild using the latest technology, eventually overtaking established industries
elsewhere. Start-up industries may begin with the latest technology which in-
cumbents are slow to adopt. Brezis et al. (1993) cite cases where new technolo-
gies have contributed to overtaking by entire countries rather than individual
sectors: the United Kingdom overtaking the Netherlands, and the United States
subsequently overtaking the United Kingdom.
The incentives to adopt a new technology depend on the ¯rm's ability to use
the previous generation of technology. This ability may depend on the experience
the ¯rm has had with the technology, i..e., on the amount of learning-by-doing
that has occurred. Chari and Hopenhayn (1991), Parente (1994) and Stokey
(1988) study learning-by-doing as a force for sustained growth. Brezis et al.
1(1993), Krussell and Rios-Rull (1996), and Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) show
that learning-by-doing can give rise to the type of overtaking noted in the growth
literature. An agent accustomed to an existing technology may be unwilling to
adopt a newer technology which requires learning and leads to lower pro¯ts in
the short run. An agent who is less familiar with the existing technology has a
lower opportunity cost of adopting the new technology. The second agent may
adopt the new technology and eventually overtake the ¯rst, who was initially
more advanced.1
Brezis et al. (1993) study a general equilibrium model in which learning is a
non-excludable public good within a country. In this situation, ¯rms have no
incentive to consider future payo®s when making their adoption decision. (See
their footnote 6.) Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) study a partial equilibrium
model in which learning is internal to the ¯rm, but they assume that ¯rms solve
a succession of static problems. Thus, in both of these models, agents are myopic:
the adoption decision depends on a comparison of current pro¯ts under the old
and new technology.
Forward-looking ¯rms who internalize learning-by-doing would consider the
future stream of payo®s in deciding whether to adopt the new technology. In
order to determine the sensitivity of the overtaking result to the assumption of
myopia, we replace the myopic decision-maker in Jovanovic and Nyarko's (1996;
hereafter, JN) model with a forward-looking agent. The possibility of overtaking
is robust, in the sense that it can occur even when agents are forward looking.
However, overtaking is less likely to occur when agents are forward looking, and
it never occurs if agents are su±ciently patient.
We also examine the e®ect of the discount rate on the frequency of adoption.
Forward looking agents adopt new technologies more frequently than myopic
1There is an industrial organization literature on leapfrogging which is closely related to the
economic growth literature we cite in the text. The IO literature emphasizes ¯rms' strategic
incentives to change a decision, such as improving technology. Budd et al. (1993) review
recent contributions to leapfrogging models in IO, and Brezis et al. (1994) discuss the relation
between the two literatures. Motta et al. (1997) study a model in which trade changes a
¯rm's strategic decision (quality, in their case), and overtaking can occur. Their model thus
incorporates elements of both the IO and economic growth literatures.
2agents. At least for small discount factors, the frequency of adoption is monotonic
in the discount factor. Parente (1994) uses simulations to show that adoption
occurs more rapidly when ¯rms use higher discount factors, and when capital
markets improve. Our results complement these simulations, although the two
models are quite di®erent.
2 Model
We adapt JN's model of learning-by-doing by including forward looking agents.
The payo® associated with a particular technology depends on an unknown pa-
rameter. As the agent learns about this parameter over discrete time, the payo®
from the technology increases. An agent working with a technology of grade n
chooses x in period t and receives the payo®:
q = °
n £
1 ¡ (yt ¡ x)
2¤
; ° > 1:
After observing the payo®, the agent can infer the value of yt since she knows
°;n;x. This inferred value is yt = µn + wt, the sum of two random variables;
µn is a random variable that depends on the technology grade nt, and wt is an
i.i.d. normal random variable with zero mean and variance ¾2
w. The agent knows
the distribution of wt. The agent does not know the value of µn but has prior
beliefs about it. Before learning yt the agent maximizes the expected payo® by
setting x equal to the expected value of yt, conditional on information available
in period t:
x = Et[yt] = Et[µn]
where the second equality follows from the fact that wt is white noise.2 This






where vart(µn) is the variance of µn conditional on information available in period
t:
2This solution remains valid in the context of dynamic optimization because the information
generation is independent of the action choice.
3The agent can switch to a higher grade technology in any period. We assume
that technology grades are integer-valued and the agent can switch only to the
next grade in one period. There is no cost of switching except that the agent
has to learn about the new technology. Skills acquired in working with the old
technology are only partially transferable. Di®erent grades of technology are
linked to each other according to the following relationship:
µn+1 =
p
® µn + ²n+1 (2)
where ²n+1 s N(0;¾2
²) and µn and ²n+1 are independent.
The agent updates her prior on µn based on the signal yt: Denote the precision
of the unknown technological parameter µn in period t by ´t and the precision





w. Obviously ´t and º can take only positive
real values, and we assume that º > 1. This restriction implies that agents earn
positive pro¯ts for su±ciently large ´. In period 1 the agent begins with a Normal
prior on the current technology (the value of µ) with precision ´1.
We now describe how ´ changes over time. First suppose that there is no
technology switch in period t: Since wt is a Normal random variable, given the
Normal prior on the random variable µn, its precision is updated in period t
according to the following formula (DeGroot, 1970):
´t+1 = ´t + º: (3)
If the agent switches to a new technology, the variance is updated through two
steps. The ¯rst step is due to the technology switch and second to the observation
of the outcome from the new technology. The ¯rst step transforms the variance
(prior to the switch) vart(µn) to ® ¢ vart(µn) + ¾2
² (the variance after the switch)
due to the transformation of µn as in equation (2). The agent then chooses x,
observes qt, infers yt, and updates beliefs about the value of µn+1. The second
step transforms the post-switch variance using equation (3). Combining the two,

















Hereafter we restrict attention to state space where ´ ¸ h(´). This restriction
is innocuous, since for any initial condition it must be satis¯ed in ¯nite time,
regardless of the agent's upgrade decisions. If the restriction is satis¯ed at any
period, it holds in all subsequent periods. Moreover, given the interpretation of
the function h(´), the model is sensible only when the restriction is satis¯ed. (If
´ < h(´); upgrading increases precision, which means that the agent knows more
about the new technology than about the old technology.)
We now introduce forward looking agents. The agent maximizes the present
value of the in¯nite stream of payo®s with a discount factor, ¯ > 0. In period
1 the agent starts with an arbitrary grade of technology, which we normalize to
be grade n = 0. De¯ne kt = 0 if the agent decides to stick with the current
technology in period t and kt = 1 if the agent chooses to upgrade. The strategy
pro¯le is (k1;k2;:::). De¯ne Tn = mintfk1 + k2 + ::: + kt ¸ ng, the period in
which the agent switches to the nth grade of technology, with the convention
that T0 = 0. Given a strategy (k1;k2;:::), we can use the single-period expected
payo® in equation (1) to compute the discounted expected payo®.
Suppose that the agent has the precision ´ at the beginning of the ¯rst period.
The sequence problem which maximizes the discounted expected payo®, given


















where ´t is updated according to either equation (3) or equation (4). The ¯rst
argument of W ¤ is the precision, ´, and the second is the technology grade, n
(here n = 0).
We use the sequence problem to formulate the dynamic programming equation
(DPE). The payo® from the agent's choice depends on the grade of the technology
5and the precision. Hence the DPE has two state variables, nt and ´t:
e V (´t;nt) = max
kt2f0;1g





´] if kt = 0
°n+1[¹ ¡ 1





if kt = 0
if kt = 1;
and
nt+1 = nt + kt:
An optimal policy, k¤(´;n); solves the DPE (5).
3 Preliminaries
We ¯rst prove the existence of the solution to the DPE (5) and then show that
the optimal adoption decision depends only on the precision, ´. The following as-
sumption guarantees the equivalence of the solution to the DPE and the solution
to the original sequence problem.
Assumption 1 ¯° < 1:
We need the equivalence between the two problems in order to justify using
the DPE in later analysis.
Proposition 1 1. There exists a solution to the DPE (5).
2. Under Assumption 1, the solution to the DPE satisfying
lim
t!1¯
te V (´t;nt) = 0
is the unique solution to the sequence problem (SP).
6Proof. The proof for part 1 of the proposition is standard; de¯ne the operator
T e V = max
k2f0;1g
fF(k : ´t;nt) + ¯e V (´t+1;nt + k)g:
>From equation (5) and T is easily seen to be a contraction mapping with
modulus ¯:
The second part follows from the result that if the solution to the sequence
problem (SP) is bounded, the solution to the DPE satisfying
lim
t!1¯
te V (´t;nt) = 0
is the unique solution to the sequence problem (SP). (Theorem 4.3 on p.72 of
Stokey and Lucas (1989)) Hence it su±ces to prove that Assumption 1 implies
that the solution to the sequence problem (SP) is bounded:



























Therefore the solution to the sequence problem (SP) is bounded.
Next we show that the optimal upgrade rule depends on the value of ´, but
not on the grade of technology n or on time, t.
Proposition 2 The optimal upgrade rule depends only on ´. That is, the solu-
tion to the DPE (5) is a correspondence k = k¤(´).
Proof. We use the fact that F(k;´;n) = °nF(k;´;0) to \guess" the trial
solution: e V (´;n) = °nV (´) for some function V Given the uniqueness of e V (´;n),
this trial solution must be correct if it solves the DPE. Since the equation of
motion of ´ is independent of n, we can substitute the trial solution into equation
(5) to obtain an equivalent DPE
°





Dividing both sides by °n results in a DPE { and thus an optimal decision rule
{ which is independent of both n and t.
74 Choice of Technology
4.1 Myopic Case
Before analyzing the case for forward looking agents, we review JN's results for
the case where agents base their current adoption decisions only on pro¯ts in the
current period. In this case, agents solve the problem maxf¹ ¡ 1
´;°(¹ ¡ 1
h(´))g,
which uses the de¯nition ¹ ´ º¡1
º > 0 in equation (1), and the de¯nition of
h(´). The ¯rst term in the maximand equals pro¯ts if the agent sticks with the
current technology, and the second equals pro¯ts if the agent upgrades to the
next generation of technology. (We ignore the factor °n, which a®ects pro¯ts
under both alternatives, but not the adoption decision.) The agent sticks with





¡¹(° ¡ 1) ¸ 0:
The function z(´) gives the increased pro¯ts, in the current period, resulting
from not upgrading. In other words, z(´) is the opportunity cost of adoption.
The slope of z(´) has the same sign as 1 ¡ ®°. If there exists a positive root




The agent is indi®erent between upgrading and sticking if and only if ´ = ´c, i.e.
when the opportunity cost of adoption is zero.




° stagnation; never upgrade (possible) overtaking; upgrade if




° standard case; upgrade if continual upgrading
´ > ´c @´c
Table 1: The Myopic Model
8Table 1 summarizes the relation between the parameter values and theoptimal
decision. In entries along the diagonal, it is optimal either never to upgrade or to
upgrade in every period, regardless of the value of ´. In these situations, ´c does
not exist. In the lower left entry of Table 1, agents with low precision stick with
the current technology until they learn to use it su±ciently well (until ´ ¸ ´c),
at which time they upgrade. We refer to this as the \standard" case.
In the upper right entry, it is optimal to upgrade only if the agent has low
precision. An agent who is relatively unfamiliar with the current technology (i.e.,
has low precision ´ < ´c) upgrades, whereas the agent who knows how to use the
current technology well (i.e. has high precision ´ > ´c) sticks with it. In this
situation, the agent with lower initial precision (and thus, lower initial pro¯ts)
may eventually obtain higher pro¯ts: she continues to upgrade her technology
even though she never becomes expert at using it. In that sense, she overtakes
the agent with high initial precision.
In order to guarantee that overtaking occurs, we need the following additional
restriction. De¯ne ´s as the (unique) positive steady state to equation (4).
Assumption 2 ´c > ´s:
The following lemma summarizes the overtaking result in JN.
Assumption 3 Lemma 1 (Overtaking) When ®° < 1, ¾2
² >
¹(°¡1)
° , and As-
sumption 2 holds, an agent with initial precision ´ < ´c eventually earns higher
pro¯ts than an agent with initial precision ´ > ´c:
Proof. The agent with initial precision ´ > ´c never upgrades, so ´t ! 1 and
her pro¯ts converge to °n0¹, where n0 is the initial grade of technology. The agent
with initial precision ´ < ´ccontinues to upgrade in every period so nt ! 1 and
´t ! ´s. Thus, her pro¯ts approach +1 provided that ¹ ¡
1
h(´s) > 0. Suppose
to the contrary that ¹¡
1







(since h(´s) < ´s), so it is not optimal to upgrade at ´s, contradicting the
assumptions of the lemma.
If Assumption 2 did not hold, all agents would eventually cease to upgrade,
and overtaking might not occur. Hereafter, when discussing the case of overtak-
9ing, we maintain Assumption 2.
4.2 General Case
This section generalizes the results from the myopic setting. All of the four
possibilities described in Table 1 remain when ¯ is positive. Thus, the possibility
that overtaking occurs does not rely on the assumption that agents are myopic.
However, if agents are su±ciently patient, overtaking cannot occur. We also
show that a positive value of ¯ never decreases, and typically increases the set of
precision levels at which upgrading is optimal. In this sense, a forward looking
agent upgrades more frequently than a myopic agent.
First we de¯ne overtaking in the general setting. Overtaking requires that
there is an interval of ´ over which the agent is willing to upgrade. Moreover,
if the initial precision lies in this interval, the equilibrium technology sequence
is unbounded: limt!1 nt = 1. There is also a critical value of ´, which we
denote ´, above which the agent never upgrades. Thus, if one agent begins with
precision in the interval for which upgrading continues, and a second agent begins
with ´ > ´, the ¯rst agent eventually uses higher grade technology and receives
higher pro¯ts in every period, regardless of their initial technologies (their initial
values of n).
The next two theorems analyze the ¯rst row of Table 1 when ¯ > 0. The-
orem 1 shows that overtaking is a generic possibility. Theorem 2 shows that a
su±ciently large value of ¯ eliminates the possibility of overtaking. If ¯ is large
it is optimal to sometimes upgrade, under con¯gurations of parameter values for
which upgrading is never optimal when ¯ = 0 (i.e. in the upper left entry in
Table 1).




overtaking occurs when ¯ = 0), overtaking can occur for small positive values of
¯.
Proof. We show that for su±ciently small but positive values of ¯; it is
optimal to upgrade in every period when ´ is small, and it is optimal never to
upgrade when ´ is large. Using equation (6) and the de¯nition of z(´), it is
10optimal not to upgrade if
z(´) > ¯[°V (h(´) + º) ¡ V (´ + º)]: (7)
V (´) is nondecreasing and V (
1
¹) > 0; since the strategy of never upgrading in
the future gives a stream of positive payo®s when ´ >
1
¹. Thus, for ´ ¸
1
¹,
the right side of equation (7) is bounded above by ¯°V (h(´) + º). For all ´,
¯°V (h(´) + º) is bounded above by
¯°¹
1¡¯°(which equals the present value of the
payo® if a new technology is adopted in every period and the precision instantly
becomes in¯nite). De¯ne ´¤ as the unique positive solution to z(´) =
¯°¹
1¡¯°.
Given the assumed parameter restrictions, ´¤ exists for ¯ su±ciently small but
positive. Thus, equation (7) is satis¯ed, and it is optimal not to upgrade for
´ ¸ ´ ´ maxf´¤;
1
¹g.
It is optimal to upgrade if the inequality in equation (7) is reversed. The right
side of equation (7) is approximately 0 for small ¯; the left side is independent
of ¯ and is strictly negative for ´ in the neighborhood of ´s (since ´s < ´c).
Therefore, for su±ciently small ¯ there exists a critical value of ´ greater than
´s, below which it is optimal to upgrade. If the initial value of ´ is below this
critical value, the agent upgrades in every period. Since ¹ ¡ 1
h(´s) > 0 by lemma
1, overtaking occurs
Although the possibility of overtaking is generic, it never occurs if agents are
su±ciently patient.
Theorem 2 Suppose Assumption 1 holds.
1. If ®° < 1, ¾2
² >
¹(°¡1)
° , and Assumption 2 holds (so that overtaking occurs
when ¯ = 0), there exists ¯
¤ <
1
° such that for all ¯ ¸ ¯
¤; overtaking cannot
occur.
2. If ®° > 1, ¾2
² >
¹(°¡1)
° (so that it is never optimal to upgrade when ¯ = 0),
and in addition ¹ ¡
1
h(´s) > 0;3 it is sometimes optimal to upgrade when
¯ ¸ ¯
¤:
3When ´c does not exist, we obviously cannot invoke Assumption 2. We therefore impose
this inequality directly.
11Proof. 1. Overtaking requires that agents with su±ciently high precision
never upgrade. We show that never upgrading in the future cannot be an optimal
policy when ¯ is large. De¯ne ¼s ´ ¹ ¡
1
h(´s), which is positive by lemma 1.
Therefore the value of the optimal program at ´s is V (´s) ¸
¼s
1¡¯°: The payo®
from never upgrading is bounded above by
¹
1¡¯: Monotonicity of V (´) implies





i.e. if ¯ >
¹¡¼s
°¹¡¼s ´ ¯
¤. Since ° > 1; ¯
¤ <
1
°. Thus there exists a range of




which overtaking cannot occur.
2. The proof of part 2 uses the same argument to show that never upgrading
is not optimal when ¯ is su±ciently large.
We next show how forward-looking behavior changes the set of ´ at which
upgrading is optimal. We de¯ne ´c¯ as a value of ´ at which the agent with
discount rate ¯ is indi®erent between sticking with the current technology and
upgrading. That is, ´c¯ satis¯es
z(´) = ¯ [°V (h(´) + º) ¡ V (´ + º)] (8)
(so ´c0 = ´c). As with the static case, ´c¯ may not exist, in which case the
agent either upgrades in every period, or never upgrades. Unlike the static case,
we have not shown that ´c¯ is unique. When we refer to ´c¯ we always mean
any value of ´ that satis¯es equation (8). We show that z(´c¯) > 0 for ¯ > 0.
This inequality means that at a level of precision where the agent is indi®erent
between upgrading and sticking, upgrading reduces pro¯ts in the current period.
We ¯rst state two facts which we use to prove this result.
Lemma 2 De¯ne the function Â(´;w) ´ (° ¡1)¹+ 1
´+w ¡
°
h(´)+w: Â(´;w) is an
increasing function of w.
Proof. Di®erentiate the function Â and use the restriction that ´ > h(´).
Lemma 3 h(´) + º > h(´ + º):
Proof. h(´ + º) < h(´) + h0(´)º < h(´) + º where the ¯rst inequality
follows from concavity and the second from the restriction ´ > h(´) which implies
h0(´) < 1.
12Proposition 3 For ¯ > 0, at a level of precision where the agent is indi®erent
between upgrading and sticking, upgrading causes losses in the current period:
z(´c¯) > 0:
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that
z(´
c¯) · 0 (9)
We derive a contradiction for the two interesting cases.4 Case 1: it is optimal to
upgrade at ´c¯ ¡² for small positive ² and it is optimal to stick with the current
technology for T periods at ´c¯ + ². (We allow the possibility that T = 1, a
necessary condition for overtaking.) Case 2: It is optimal to stick at ´c¯ ¡² for
small positive ² and it is optimal to upgrade at ´c¯ + ²: (Case 2 corresponds to
the second row of Table 1.)












T°V (h(´ + Tº))
where T (possibly in¯nite) is the optimal time of the next upgrade. Consider
the deviation of moving forward the time of the next upgrade, e.g. upgrading at












T°V (h(´) + Tº):
Using these expressions, we have








T° fV (h(´) + Tº) ¡ V (h(´ + Tº)g:
Evaluate this di®erence at ´ = ´c¯, where Â(´;0) = ¡z(´) ¸ 0 by equation (9).
By lemma 2, Â(´;tº) > 0 for t > 0, so the term in the square brackets is positive.
By lemma 3 and monotonicity of V , the term in the curly brackets is positive.
Therefore D(´c¯) ¡ V (´c¯) > 0, which contradicts optimality.
4We ignore the unlikely possibility that the agent prefers to upgrade (or prefers to stick) for
both ´c¯ § ², ² small. Even if this situation could arise, it is plausible that a perturbation of
parameters would eliminate it.
13Case 2. Choose ´ · ´c¯ with ´+º > ´c¯. The optimal policy at such a value














2°V (h(´ + º) + º):
Consider the deviation of upgrading in the current period rather than in the next














2°V (h(´) + 2º):
The di®erence in the payo® is









2° fV (h(´) + 2º) ¡V (h(´ + º) + º)g:
Evaluate this di®erence at ´ = ´c¯. The ¯rst term on the right side is non-
negative by equation (9), the second term (square brackets) is positive by lemma
3, and the third term (curly brackets) is positive by lemma 3 and the monotonic-
ity of the value function. Consequently, D(´) ¡ V (´) > 0, which contradicts
optimality.
Proposition 3 demonstrates the trade-o® the agent faces in the choice of tech-
nology under learning-by-doing. Forward-looking agents upgrade to the new tech-
nology because the future bene¯t from the new technology exceeds the short-term
cost from discarding the familiar old technology. In other words, forward looking
agents upgrade when the current payo® from the new technology is strictly less
than the current payo® from the old technology, whereas myopic agents upgrade
only when the current payo® from the new technology is at least as great as the
current payo® from the old technology.
Proposition 3 enables us to compare the critical values ´c¯ and ´c. In order
to allow for the possibility that ´c¯ is not unique, we de¯ne ´c¯ = maxf´c¯g and
´c¯ = minf´c¯g. We have
Corollary 1 Suppose ´c¯ and ´c exist. Then ´c¯ < ´c for ®° > 1; and ´c¯ > ´c
for ®° < 1.
14Proof. By inspection, z(´) is monotonic, and the derivative dz
d´ has the same
sign as 1 ¡ ®°: From Proposition 3, z(´c¯) > 0 = z(´c). Hence, when dz
d´ >
0;´c¯ > ´c, implying ´c¯ > ´c for ®° < 1: When
dz
d´ < 0;´c¯ < ´c, implying
´c¯ < ´c for ®° > 1:
Figure 1, which shows the graph of z(´) for the two cases ®° < 1 (solid
curve) and ®° > 1 (dashed curve), illustrates the corollary. We use this result
to show how a positive value of ¯ a®ects the decision to upgrade. De¯ne the
\upgrade set" ¢¯ = f´ : k(´) = 1g, the set of ´ for which it is optimal to upgrade,
given ¯. Table 1 implicitly de¯nes ¢0 (the upgrade set for ¯ = 0) under di®erent
con¯gurations of parameter values. The following theorem compares the upgrade
sets for ¯ = 0 and for 0 < ¯ <
1
° under these four con¯gurations of parameter
values.
Theorem 3 For 0 < ¯ <
1
°; ¢0 µ ¢¯:
Proof. It is convenient to prove the claim for separate cases in Table 1. That
is,




continual upgrading (®° < 1 and ¾2
² <
¹(°¡1)
° ), then ¢0 µ ¢¯.










We take these cases in turn.
(i) Under stagnation, ¢0 = ; µ ¢¯: (From Theorem 2, ¢¯ may be nonempty,
in which case ¢0 ½ ¢¯.) Under continual overtaking, ¢0 = <+, and it is
straightforward to show that ¢¯ = <+.
(ii) In this case, ¢0 = f´ : ´ > ´cg. If ´c¯ exists, then it must be the case
that ¢¯ ¶ f´ : ´ > ´c¯g: If this relation did not hold, then for su±ciently large




can show that for su±ciently large ´ the payo® of upgrading once and then never
subsequently upgrading is greater than the payo® of never upgrading. Since
15´c¯ < ´c from Corollary 1, we obtain ¢¯ ¶ f´ : ´ > ´c¯g ¾ ¢0: If ´c¯ does not
exist, it is optimal to upgrade for all ´, so ¢¯ = <+:
(iii) In this case, ¢0 = f´ : ´ · ´cg. If ´c¯ exists, then from Corollary 1,
´c¯ > ´c. We need to show that ¢¯ ¶ f´ : ´ < ´c¯g: (This relationship implies
that for ¯ > 0 it is strictly better to upgrade at ´ = ´c:) Suppose, to the contrary,
that for ´ < ´c¯ it is optimal not to upgrade. Then at ´ = ´c it is optimal to
stick with the current technology for T ¸ 1 periods, where T is the smallest
integer that satis¯es ´ = ´c+Tº ¸ ´c¯. At time T time it is optimal to upgrade.
Consider the deviation of upgrading in the current period (when ´ = ´c) rather
than waiting T periods. The additional pro¯ts resulting from this deviation,










c) + Tº) ¡ V (h(´
c + Tº))g:
The ¯rst term (square brackets) is positive using the de¯nition of ´c and lemma
2, and the second term (curly brackets) is positive by lemma 3 and monotonicity
of V (´). Consequently, it must be optimal to upgrade when ´ = ´c and ¯ > 0.
Therefore ¢¯ ¶ f´ : ´ < ´c¯g ¾ f´ : ´ < ´cg = ¢0:
If ´c¯ does not exist, it is optimal to upgrade for all ´, so ¢¯ = <+:
Theorem 3 means that forward-looking agents are \more likely" to upgrade
than myopic agents. For example, if overtaking occurs in the myopic setting,
the introduction of a positive discount factor reduces (and according to Theorem
2 may eliminate) the values of ´ above which further upgrading never occurs.
In addition, if ¾2
² <
¹(°¡1)
° (the second row in Table 1) so that overtaking does




° , ®° > 1 (the upper left entry in Table 1) myopic agents would
never upgrade. For these parameter values and ¯ > 0; agents might upgrade
when ´ is su±ciently large. In this case, the introduction of a positive discount
factor transforms the \stagnation" scenario to the \standard" scenario, in which
agents wait until they are su±ciently familiar with the current technology before
upgrading.
Theorem 3 compares the upgrade sets under a myopic and a forward looking
agent. The next theorem compares upgrade sets for small values of ¯. To
16emphasize the dependence of the value function on ¯, we replace V (´) with
V (´;¯).





Proof. De¯ne the function
G(´;¯) ´ z(´) ¡¯ [°V (h(´) + º;¯) ¡ V (´ + º;¯)]:
G(´;¯) is the gain from sticking with the current technology, and ´c¯ satis¯es
G(´c¯;¯) = 0. From equation (7) it is optimal to upgrade if and only if G(´;¯) ·








Continuity of G(´;¯) implies that ¢¯ µ ¢¯0
i® G¯(´c¯;¯) < 0: (If G´(´c¯;¯) < 0,
it is optimal to upgrade for ´ = ´c¯ +², so a decrease in ´c¯ enlarges the upgrade
set. If G´(´c¯;¯) > 0, it is optimal to upgrade for ´ = ´c¯ ¡ ², so an increase in
´c¯ enlarges the upgrade set.) From the de¯nition of G(¢) we have
@G
@¯




@V (h(´) + º : ¯)
@¯
¡
@V (´ + º;¯)
@¯
¶
From Proposition 3, the term in square brackets is positive (since it equals
z(´c¯) > 0). The derivative of V (´ + º;¯) with respect to ¯ is positive and
bounded above by
¹°
(1¡¯°)2 since the value function is bounded above by
¹
1¡¯° as
shown in Proposition 1. Consequently the term on the second line can be made
arbitrarily small by choosing small ¯: It follows that for small ¯ the upgrade set
is monotone in ¯.
Theorem 4 implies that as the agent becomes more patient, she upgrades to
the new technology for a larger set of precision levels. The combined results of
Theorems 1-4 can be related to the role of capital markets and technology choice
17at di®erent stages of development.5 At an early stage of economic development,
an economy may have no ¯nancial markets, causing the cost of capital and the
discount rate to be high. In this case overtaking occurs for some initial conditions
and parameter values. As the economy develops, ¯nancial markets also develop,
leading to a lower discount rate and causing ¯rms to become more willing to
upgrade. Since overtaking is less likely for patient agents, convergence is more
likely to occur among developed economies, and certainly occurs if the discount
rate becomes su±ciently small.
5 Conclusion
When skills are only partly transferrable across generations of technology, being
more expert at using an existing technology may make it easier adopt a higher
grade. However, greater skill at using the existing technology also leads to a
higher opportunity cost of upgrading. The agent who is skilled at using the
existing technology may decide not to upgrade. An agent who is less skilled
has a lower opportunity cost and may upgrade, even though she cannot use the
new technology as pro¯tably as the ¯rst agent. The less skilled agent may
continue to upgrade to increasingly sophisticated technologies, even though she
never becomes expert at using any of them. She eventually achieves higher
pro¯ts than the more skilled agent.
This kind of overtaking can occur even when agents are forward looking,
as in Parente's (1994) model. However, overtaking never occurs if agents are
su±ciently patient. Previous papers emphasized the characteristics of technology
and learning that lead to the possibility of overtaking. We have emphasized the
need for a su±ciently low discount factor in order to obtain overtaking.
We also showed that when the myopic agent's upgrade decision depends non-
trivially on her skill level, a forward looking agent decides to upgrade for a larger
set of skill levels. At least for small discount factors, the upgrade set is nonde-
creasing in the discount factor. In this sense, forward looking agents are more
5Parente (1994) made a similar point based on a simulation result that the availability of
capital market a®ects the develpment path via the technology choice.
18likely to upgrade, and they upgrade more frequently.
Overtaking occurs because the skilled agent, who can use the new technology
more pro¯tably, also has a higher opportunity cost of upgrading, relative to the
unskilled agent. In the model we analyzed, the higher opportunity cost is the
result of learning-by-doing. However, other actions taken in the past might also
give rise to overtaking. For example, a producer who uses the current technology
may ¯nd it cheaper to upgrade to a newer technology, relative to a producer who
is not using the current technology. However, the ¯rst producer also has less
incentive to adopt the newer technology, because of the alternative to continue
using the technology which has already been purchased.
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